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Ecological problems are social and moral as well as scientific and technological. They result from 
human interactions with the natural environment that have negative effects on humans, 
nonhuman animals, and ecological systems (Attfield, 2014).  
In philosophical approaches to environmental problems, there are tensions among 
normative stances (Callicott, 1998) advocating different policies and practices for environmental 
and animal welfare concerns. Ecocentrists advocate preserving ecosystems, species, habitats, and 
biodiversity (Warren et al., 2018; Xu et al., 2009; Colwell et al., 2008) but ignore the problems of 
animal suffering and welfare stressed by animal liberationists like Singer (1995, on a utilitarian 
basis) and Regan (1976, on a rights basis). Ecological research tends to focus on species loss and 
dwindling refuges, not the individual animals (Humphreys, 2020), whose interests only count if 
they are members of a species under threat. This is the case in Thailand for elephants: as if there 
were an ontological distinction between wild elephants (an endangered species, hence protected 
to a certain extent), and domesticated or captive elephants (not considered “wild” and thus not 
afforded the same level of protection).  
Taking animals’ interests seriously obliges us to be concerned about the individual welfare 
of both domestic and wild nonhuman animals. In the case of wild elephants and their 
“domesticated” counterparts, it would behoove us to recognize individuals in both categories as 
individuals with the same biological imperatives — imperatives grossly undermined by various 
forms of captivity (Humphreys, 2016).  
Ecocentrists hold that normative approaches concerned primarily with the good of 
individuals (such as biocentrism and sentientism) neglect the good of species and ecosystems 
(Rolston, 1998). This focus on species may be what has led conservationists to avoid rehabilitating 
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and rewilding of animals, as Baker & Winkler (2020) (B&W) explain in their target articles, citing 
Aitken (2004). A species is a general term for an interbreeding population of individuals with 
common traits — individuals who have intrinsic value irrespective of the value they contribute to 
the ecosystem of which they are a part. Sentientists and biocentrists hold that it is individuals, 
rather than species, that have intrinsic value.  
Taylor (2011) (a biocentrist) argues for the moral standing of all living creatures, and for 
their equal worth. This form of biocentrism, however, does not allow us to take into account 
differences between species, or between individuals of the same species. Such differences could 
indicate differences in moral significance when interests conflict. Other forms of biocentrism 
recognize that in practice, equality does not mean equal treatment. For example, the life of a 
plant has less value than the life of an elephant. Singer argues that we should apply the principle 
of equal consideration to all animals capable of suffering, nonhuman as well as human; failure to 
do so amounts to unfair discrimination or speciesism.  
The principle would apply to both wild and captive elephants so their interests would 
deserve equal consideration. Such interests include exercising their biological dispositions and 
their complex cognitive abilities, foraging over diverse and vast areas, as well as forming social 
groups and having families (Holdrege, 2003). These interests are significantly more restricted in 
captive elephants (Snijders, 2020). In the case of wild elephants, much more effort is needed to 
protect their dwindling habitats.  
Applying the principle to captive elephants would certainly involve rehabilitating and 
returning to a wild or at least a semi-wild environment, but also recognising the human interests 
that stand to be affected. Ecological problems are partly social problems; some human and animal 
interests are intertwined today to the point of codependency. This is the case with elephants (wild 
and captive) in Thailand (Pauketat, 2020). There are also significant conflicts of interests 
(Blumstein and Lynch, 2020). But proposals to rewild elephants by working in collaboration with 
relevant human groups, including Karen communities, present plausible and innovative solutions 
for elephant conservation efforts in Thailand. In our era of environmental crisis, the interests of 
humans and elephants cannot be met if they are pitted against one another. A codependency 
needs to be recognized. Rehabilitation and rewilding practices can take this into account, enabling 
elephants to live a life natural for their own kind and enabling human communities to flourish in 
the process. 
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